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Commentary

Was Magna in the PubLic interest?
ANITA ANAND *
THE RECENT COLLAPSE OF Magna's dual-class share structure was one of the
largest sale of control transactions in Canadian history. The transaction involved the
purchase by Magna of all of the Class B (preference) shares-constituting 0.6
per cent of the equity but 66 per cent of the voting rights--owned by the Stronach
Trust, the holding entity of Frank Stronach, in exchange for US $300 million
and nine million Class A subordinate voting shares.' The effect of the transaction
was a significant dilution of the Class A shares as well as a premium paid to the
Stronach Trust of approximately 1,800 per cent. The Magna board neither made
a recommendation to shareholders nor provided them with a valuation or fairness opinion. The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) declined to stop the
transaction under its public interest power. The OSC reasoned that regardless of
its own views regarding the fairness of the transaction, the Class A shareholders
should decide whether to accept the transaction by a vote, which is required as
part of the statutory arrangement process.2
The OSC's decision was flawed. To determine the fate of minority shareholders,
the OSC relied on both the shareholder vote and the Ontario Superior Court ofJustice's
application of the "fair and reasonable" test pertaining to the law of arrangements. 3 The OSC did not consider whether the transaction would be injurious
to minority shareholders specifically or to capital markets generally if permitted
to proceed. It thus did not fully consider the public interest.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Thanks to John Tuer and Andrew
Green for valuable comments and to Grant Bishop, Gordon Houseman, and Adam Friedlan
for excellent research assistance.
1.
2.
3.

MagnaInternationalInc. (Re) (2010), 34 OSC Bull 1290 at para 103 (OSC) [Full Reasons].
Ibid.See also Magna InternationalInc. (Re) (2010), 33 OSC Bull 6013 [InitialReasons].
BCE Inc v 1976 Debenmreholers,[2008] 3 SCR 560 at para 46 [BCE].
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Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Committeefor the Equal
Treatment ofAsbestos Minority Shareholersv Ontario (Securities Commission),' the
OSC's power to uphold the public interest must be considered as a means to preserve and protect the capital markets. Thus, neither the shareholder vote nor the
actions taken by a firm in the name of fairness generally is sufficient to determine
whether a transaction is in the public interest. Rather, case law, including the Asbestos
decision, dictates that the term "public interest" has a forward-looking element in
which the interests of the capital markets must be taken into account more broadly.'
The Magna' decision appears to be inconsistent with this law.
Further, the transaction presented to the minority shareholders was arguably
abusive. They were asked to choose between the lesser of two evils. If they voted
against the transaction, they would be signalling their desire to maintain the status quo
in which the Class B shareholder controlled Magna while holding 0.6 per cent
of the equity. On the other hand, if they voted for the transaction, they would
be approving the collapse of the firm's dual-class share structure and the firm's
repurchase of the equity held by a controlling shareholder who had historically
extracted significant private benefits of control. The caveat, however, was that the
total consideration to be paid for this transaction to occur was exorbitant.
This dilemma faced by minority shareholders suggests that the greater the
private benefits that the controlling shareholder extracts from a corporation with
dual-dass shares, the higher the premium that will be paid to extricate the corporation
from the controlling shareholder.7 Indeed, the board of directors' decision to
proceed with the transaction may heighten the incentive for a controlling shareholder
to increase its private benefits in order to extort a greater premium for the collapse
of a dual-class structure.. This is the power of the despot-that the controlling
shareholder now seems able to exert.
After the OSC's decision in Magna, it appears that a board's sole task in such
transactions is to ensure that shareholders have sufficient information and the
opportunity to vote on the transaction. Furthermore, rather than consider the
protection of capital markets on a prospective basis, it seems that in considering
dual-class share structures, the OSC can overlook concerns of the broader public

4.
5.
6.
7.

[2001] 2 SCR 132 [Asbestos], aff'd [1999] 0J No 388 (Ont CA).
Ibid.
Referring to FullReasons, supra note 1, and InitialReasons, supra note 2, collectively.
See also Jeff MacIntosh, "Some Reflections on Magna and Dual Class Share Structures" (2011)
[unpublished], online: <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/userfiles/cmi/file/jeff/20
macintosh%20paper.docx>.
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interest and instead defer to corporate law processes. This appears to be a departure
from existing legal precedent regarding the public interest power.
This commentary proceeds as follows: Part I sets the background for the
discussion by outlining the arrangement at issue, the OSC's decisions, and the
meaning of "public interest"; Part II analyzes the OSC's decision, arguing that the
OSC inappropriately relied on the shareholder vote by deferring to the processes of
the Superior Court; Part III analyzes the concept of "abuse" and suggests avenues
for reform; and Part IV concludes.
It is important to bear in mind that the purpose of securities regulation
differs from that of corporate law, despite overlap between the two with regard to
certain legal requirements (such as proxy solicitations, shareholder meetings and
votes, and board composition). Corporate law provides a board of directors with
the legal authority to chart the corporation's course while balancing the interests
of various stakeholders (such as minority shareholders) in the process. By contrast,
securities regulation is mainly concerned with ensuring that investors are protected, that they have confidence in capital markets, and that markets are efficient. It
is an understanding of this mandate, whether or not one agrees with its breadth,
that drives the present argument.

I. BACKGROUND
A. THE TRANSACTION AND THE OSC'S DECISIONS
Magna International is a multinational public corporation that was founded by
Frank Stronach in 1957. Prior to the transaction, Magna had a dual-class share
structure with one vote per share attaching to approximately 112 million widely
held Class A subordinate voting shares and 300 votes per share attaching to approximately 700,000 Class B shares held by Frank Stronach. This dual-class share
structure enabled Stronach to maintain control of the corporation while owning
a small percentage of its shares (0.6 per cent).
Under a plan of arrangement proposed in May 2010, the corporation sought
to collapse its dual-class share structure. The arrangement contemplated that Magna
would repurchase the shares owned by Stronach (through his holding entity,
Stronach Trust) for US $300 million and nine million Class A shares. Magna
would then have one class of outstanding shares, of which Stronach would hold
7.44 per cent. The total value of the consideration to be paid by Magna to the
Stronach Trust for the purchase and cancellation of the Class B Shares was approximately US $860 million. In addition, under certain consulting contracts
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with the corporation, Stronach would receive 3 per cent of Magna's pre-tax profits.
Magna was required to pay the fees owing under the consulting contracts for a
one-year term if they were terminated early. Finally, Magna and Stronach would
enter into a partnership that would be indirectly controlled by the Stronach Trust
in order to develop Magna's electric vehicle business.
In response to the proposed arrangement, OSC staff alleged that the transaction was contrary to the public interest for the following reasons: the circular did not
contain specific financial information that the special committee of the Magna
board (formed to consider the transaction) had obtained from its financial advisors (CIBC); the disclosure contained neither sufficient information relating to
the fairness of the transaction nor useful recommendations to shareholders; the
transaction was novel and unprecedented because the shareholders were asked
to approve it without a recommendation and without sufficient information;
and the approval and review process was inadequate. A group of shareholders,
referred to by the OSC and the Superior Court as the "Opposing Shareholders,"
also sought a permanent cease trade order because the transaction, in their view,
was abusive and coercive. 8
The OSC held that the circular did not contain sufficient disclosure. Therefore,
it ordered more disclosure to be filed and approved before the transaction could
proceed, In particular, the OSC ordered "a clear articulation"9 of how management
and the board arrived at the consideration to be paid to the Stronach Trust and
the potential economic benefits to shareholders. This disclosure was to include a
description of the potential alternatives considered by the special committee, a
discussion of the approval process adopted by the special committee, and a statement
of how CIBC assessed the transaction, including reasons why it could not render
a fairness opinion.1" The OSC did not issue a permanent cease trade order as its
staff had requested.
The OSC issued a more lengthy set of reasons after the transaction's closing.
Both sets of reasons revolved around four findings. First, the OSC rejected its staffs
claim that the transaction was abusive within the meaning of securities law, explaining that "[a]buse has been characterized by Commission decisions as something
more than unfairness. A transaction such as this is not abusive simply because the
8.

The "Opposing Shareholders" consisted of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board; Canada
Pension Pan Investment Board; Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS)
Administration Corporation; Alberta Investment Management Corporation; Letko, Brosseau
& Associates; and the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation. Initial
Reasons, supra note 2.
9. Ibid at para 41.
10. Ibid.
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price proposed to be paid is considered by certain investors to be outrageous."'"
Apart from this statement, the OSC provided little reasoning to explain why this
transaction was not abusive and, indeed, what would constitute abusive conduct
on the part of an issuer in similar circumstances. 2
Second, the OSC had no view on the fairness of the transaction. It concluded
that "[b]ased on the evidence before us, we have been unable to come to a view as
to whether or not the Proposed Transaction is unfair to Shareholders." 3
Third, the OSC viewed a shareholder vote as the necessary seal of approval
for the transaction, stating, "It is not our role as securities regulators to assess
the desirability of the Proposed Transaction from a financial or economic standpoint. That is ultimately for the Class A shareholders to determine." 4 In other
words, the OSC placed sole decision-making power with regards to whether the
transaction should proceed in the hands of the shareholders themselves. The OSC
believed that regardless of whether the deal was fair, shareholders should decide. It
explained that "any view or perception that we may have as to the possible unfairness of a transaction is not a sufficient ground upon which we can or should
intervene in the public interest."'"
Fourth, the OSC relied on what was originally (i.e., at the time the initial
reasons were being issued) a forthcoming decision of the Superior Court in deciding
whether the arrangement was "fair and reasonable" within the meaning of the
Business CorporationsAct (Ontario). In particular, the OSC took "some comfort
from the fact that an Ontario court will, as part of the arrangement process, be determining whether the arrangement giving effect to the Proposed Transaction is
fair and reasonable. Making such a determination is outside the purview of our
jurisdiction as securities regulators."' 6

11. Ibid at paras 43-44.
12. Full Reasons, supra note 1. The OSC seemed to leave the door open for a finding of abuse
over and above shareholder approval processes by stating, "We would simply add for clarity
that we should not be taken to be suggesting that shareholder approval can remedy a
transaction or circumstances that are abusive of shareholders or the capital markets. To the
contrary, if a transaction is abusive, then shareholder approval will not be sufficient" (ibidat
para 195).
13. InitialReasons,supra note 2 at para 43.
14. Ibid at para 191. This statement appears to be a dangerous abdication of the OSC's mandate
to guard against the broader capital market implications of particular transactions, as will be
discussed at Part 11(A), below.
15. Ibid at para 193.
16. Ibid at para 47.
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In short, it appears that the OSC did not believe that the transaction was
abusive. Based on the evidence reviewed, it was unable to reach a decision
relating to the fairness of the transaction to the Class A shareholders. The OSC
believed that the Class A shareholders should decide whether the transaction
should proceed, because this was a business and financial decision that they were
entitled to make. Finally, the OSC was reassured by the fact that the Superior
Court was going to oversee the transaction.
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST POWER
The starting point for understanding the public interest power is the Securities
Act itself, which provides the OSC with the ability to issue an order if, in its
opinion, it would be in the public interest to do so."7 There is a lengthy list of
sanctions that can be levied if conduct is contrary to the public interest. This list
includes cease trade orders, denials of exemptions, disgorgement, and a monetary
administrative penalty.18 Yet historically, there has been a question about how
broad the public interest power should be and which principles, if any, should
circumscribe it.
This question was answered in part by CanadianTire,1 9 a decision reached by
the OSC and upheld on appeal to the Ontario Divisional Court. The acquisition
transaction at issue involved a dual-class share structure with coattail provisions."
The OSC considered the transaction to be abusive of capital markets because it
was contrary to the intention of section 123 of the Ontario SecuritiesAct in place
at the time (which outlined the equivalent of today's public interest power) and
therefore rendered it impermissible despite there being no violation of the law."
17.
18.
19.

RSO 1990, c S.5, s 127 [SecuritiesAct].
Ibid, s 127(1).
(1978), 10 OSC Bull 857 Re CanadianTire Corp [Canadian Tire], afd CTC DealerHoldings
Ltd v Ontario Securities OSC (1987) 59 OR (2d) 79 (Ont Gen Div), leave to appeal refused
[CTC Dealer Holdings].
20. Coattail refers to a mechanism by which minority or lesser-voting shareholders are permitted
to share in gains from a takeover. If an offer for some pre-specified amount (typically 50 per
cent) of the majority holding is made, the offer must be extended to the other shareholders
(they ride the coattails, as it were). See D Lewis Johnson & Bohumir Pazderka, Its No
Gamble: The Economic & Social Benefits of Stock Markets (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1995).
21. In Canadian Tire, supra note 19, OSC staff sought a cease trade order against a takeover bid
that involved the Billes family. Counsel for the family argued that permitting the OSC to
issue a cease trade order in this case would give rise to uncertainty in the capital markets.
Counsel argued that the transaction should be permitted since it accorded with the terms of
the share attributes laid out in the articles of incorporation. The integrity of the documents
would be undermined if the takeover bid based on these share attributes were disallowed.
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'he OSC reasoned:
If abusive transactions such as the one in issue here, and this is as grossly abusive
a transaction as the OSC has had before it in recent years, are allowed to proceed,
confidence in our capital markets will inevitably suffer and individuals will be less
willing to place funds in the equity markets. That can only have a deleterious effect
on our capital markets....22

Thus, CanadianTire set the stage for the. broad application of OSC jurisdiction
in deciding which matters fall within the public interest power, especially where there
appears to be a deliberate effort to circumvent the intent of the SecuritiesAct.
Following Canadian Tire, a number of cases took a broad reading of the term
23
"public interest" and suggested that the OSC's role is distinct from that of the courts.
For example, Re Mithras Management concerned a scheme that was questioned by
the OSC as falling outside the terms of an exemption from the prospectus
requirement.24 The OSC made an order in the public interest, finding that the
exemptions did not apply to the respondents. In reaching its decision, the OSC
stated, "We are not here to punish past conduct; that is the role of the courts...
[w]e are here to restrain, as best we can, future conduct that is likely to be prejudicial
to the public interest in having capital markets that are both fair and efficient."2
The OSC thus drew a line between regulatory and judicial bodies, reiterating its role
as a securities regulator.
This distinction made by the OSC laid the foundation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Asbestos,26 a case that arose out of the decision by the Quebec government
to take control of Asbestos Corp., a leading producer of asbestos in the province.
Pursuant to the OSC's public interest power, minority shareholders sought redress
in the form of an order removing the exemptions used to effect the takeover bid.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Counsel further argued that a cease trade order should not be issued unless there was a
breach of the SecuritiesAct. Relying on a previous decision of the OSC-Re CablecastingLtd
(1978), OSC Bull 37-the OSC disagreed. On appeal, the Divisional Court reasoned by
analogy to other statutory provisions in the applicable securities act that if the Legislature
intended for discretion to be exercised only where a breach had occurred, it would have stated
this in the legislation. Because the statute contained no such statement, "the inference appears
compelling, that no such limitation is implied, and none should be implied." CTC Dealer
Holdings, supra note 19 at para 41.
Canadian Tire, supra note 19 at para 151.
Consider Re HERO Industries Ltd (1990), 13 OSC Bull 3775.
(1990), 13 OSC Bull 1600 [Re Mithras].
Ibidat 1610. See also ReAlbino (1991), 14 OSC Bull 365.
Asbestos, supra note 4. See also Anita I Anand, "Carving the Public Interest in Securities
Regulation: Contributions of Justice lacobucci" (2007) 57 UTLJ 293.
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Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice lacobucci explained that the public interest
power is meant to enable the OSC to remove from the capital markets "those whose
past conduct is so abusive as to warrant apprehension of future conduct detrimental
to the integrity of the capital markets."27 Inherent in Justice Jacobucci's judgment
is the notion that there is a societal element in the public interest power that is not
present in other SecuritiesAct enforcement provisions and that an application of
the power requires considerations over and above fairness to investors. Importantly, he explained that "[i]n considering an order in the public interest, it is an
error to focus only on thefair treatment of investors. The effect of an intervention
in the public interest on capital market efficiencies and public confidence in the
capital markets should also be considered... "28
Asbestos has been applied in a number of cases, including cases before the
Supreme Court. In Re Cartaway Resources,29 for example, brokers committed.
several breaches of the BC Securities Act,3 including failing to disclose material
information and material changes in a timely manner. One of the issues on
appeal was whether the BC Securities Commission was permitted to take general
deterrence into account in rendering sanctions under its public interest power.
The Court held that it was well within the meaning of Asbestos for the Commission to consider general deterrence in making an order under the public interest
section. 31 The Court further held that the public interest power should aim to deter
future conduct that is deleterious to capital markets. The principle for which
Asbestos and Cartaway stand is that the concept of public interest means more than
fairness and should be applied as necessary to prevent future harm to capital markets.
Prevention may include considerations of deterrence, both general and specific.
The OSC subsequently applied this broad interpretation of the public interest
power. In Re Patheon Inc, 32 for example, JLL Patheon Holdings made an offer to
purchase all of the outstanding restricted voting shares of Patheon Inc. However, a
special committee of Patheon Inc. objected to the offer because of a special voting
27. Asbestos, supra note 4 at para 43, citing Re Mithras,supra note 24.
28. See Asbestos, supra note 4 at para 41 [emphasis added].
29. [2004] SCR 672 [Cartaway].
30. RSBC 1996, c 4 18.
31. Cartaway,supra note 29 at para 61. Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, stated,
A penalty that is meant to deter generally is a penalty that is designed to keep an
occurrence from happening; it discourages similar wrongdoing in others. In a word, a
general deterrent is preventive. It is therefore reasonable to consider general deterrence as
a factor, albeit not the only one, in imposing a sanction under s. 162.

32. (2009), 32 OSC Bull 6445.
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agreement reached with an individual, Joaquin Viso, who had acquired certain
Patheon restricted voting shares. The voting agreement provided certain alleged
collateral benefits to Viso that were not afforded to other shareholders. The OSC
held that it could exercise its public interest jurisdiction even in the absence of any
violation of the SecuritiesActor of any regulation or policy statement. Holding that
the case directly engaged the animating principles of the takeover regime, including
the fair and equal treatment of shareholders when a formal bid is made, the OSC
issued a cease trade order to prevent Patheon from entering into agreements that
provided unequal consideration to shareholders within the same class.
In Re Sears CanadaInc.,a a case that involved an insider bid by the US parent
company for its Canadian subsidiary, the OSC concluded that the transaction was not
so abusive to minority shareholders that a cease trade order was justified. However,
it reiterated the purpose of its public interest power: In the absence of a specific violation
of securities law, the OSC will exercise its public interest jurisdiction to protect
the capital markets."5 The OSC ordered the US parent company to comply with
securities legislation regarding takeover bids, to extend the litigation release to all
shareholders instead of certain shareholders, and to exclude the beneficiaries of
the support agreement from participating in the minority of the majority vote."
As in Sears, it may be the case that ultimately the OSC will not cease trade in
cases that may, to some, appear to be abusive transactions. However, the salient
point is that the case law emanating from the OSC itself, as well as from the Supreme
Court, has held that the OSC must consider the prospective effects of conduct and
transactions on capital markets. This fact, and the apparent lack of attention to legal
precedent, renders the OSC's decision in Magna more perplexing, as discussed
next, in Part II.

33.
34.
35.

Re Sears Canada nc, (2006) 84 OR (3d) 61 [Sears].
Ibid at para 14.
The litigation release in this case provided that Sears Holding Corporation released a particular
shareholder, Vornado, "from any and all claims and demands of any nature arising out of or
otherwise based upon the activities of Vornado ... in connection with Vornado Realty L.P.'s
acquisition and disposition of Common Shares of Sears Canada Inc. and entering into and
performing this Agreement" (Re Sean CanadaInc, 2006 LNONOSC 1044 at para 206). In addition,
the support agreements in this case were established between Sears Holding Corporation and
the Bank of Nova Scotia, Scotia Capital, and the Royal Bank of Canada for a set number of
shares and at a set price. The agreements were important because under Ontario Securities OSC
Rule 61-501 - Insider Bids, Issuers Bids, Business Combinationsand RelatedParty Transactions,
(2004) OSC 27 OSC Bull 5975, the majority of the minority would have to approve the subsequent
acquisition transaction, and these financial instructions held shares in Sears Canada Inc.
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II. FLAWED REASONING AT THE OSC
Building on the parameters of the OSC's public interest power, this Part analyzes
the decision in Magna and contends that it is flawed. In particular, the OSC
improperly relied on the shareholder vote, which was to occur as part of
the arrangement process, in reaching its decision. Furthermore, the OSC failed
to apply the principles of the public interest power that relate to the integrity of
capital markets as a whole. The OSC also deferred to the Superior Court's oversight of the arrangement.
A. RELIANCE ON THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE
The transfer of control in a corporation is often contentious. Should a controlling
shareholder receive a premium for his or her shares because he or she has control? If
so, what should be the size of this premium? Should minority shareholders be
entitled to participate in these transactions? Debate on these issues has focused on
whether a market rule should prevail whereby parties remain unregulated and
unprotected via legal rules (in which case minority shareholders enjoy no rights in
the sale of control), or whether an "equal opportunity rule" is preferable whereby
minority shareholders are entitled to participate in the transaction on the same
terms as the controlling shareholder. 6 In the United States, the general rule
has been that minority shareholders do not enjoy participation rights in these
transactions. In Canada, by contrast, minority shareholders may participate
depending on the transaction chosen. For example, a change of control transaction structured as a plan of arrangement under the Business CorporationsAct
(Ontario)37 will require a shareholder vote (as in Magna and BCE8 ). A related
party transaction may also require a majority of the minority shareholder vote.3 9
The academic literature stresses the importance of the shareholder vote
in sale of control transactions. Lucian Bebchuk proposes a takeover bid law in
which shareholder tendering is accompanied by voting on whether the tender offer should proceed.4i Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that
36. See e.g. Lucian Bebchuk, "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control" (1994) 109
QJ of Econ 957.
37. RSO 1990, c B-16, s 182(5).
38. [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE].
39. MultilateralInstrument-ProtectionofMinority Security Holders in Special Transactions,OSC,
MI 61-101, (2007).
40. "Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers" (1985) 98 Harv L
Rev; "The Pressure to Tender An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy" (1987) 12 Del J Corp L 911.
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shareholder voting reduces agency costs because shareholders have a veto over
transactions that reduce the firm's wealth (thereby reducing their own advantages
as residual claimants)." Further, voting supplements the rights provided by contract-whether the contract terms are express or refer to provisions of a statute. 2
Even though shareholders might not actually exercise their vote, the vote will nevertheless induce the bidder to offer a fair price. Referring to "the beauty of shareholder
voting," Richard Booth explains that "putting the issue to a vote relieves any
pressure to sell for fear of being relegated to the minority... ."43 He contends that
a certain value attaches to the vote, explaining that "[s]ince a vote is clearly valuable to the bidder or management who can use it to control the company... the
shareholder will insist on getting top dollar for it...
.""He further argues that "there
is reason to believe each vote will be actively courted ...
and that much, if not all,
of the coercion (or temptation) to tender will be obviated...."41
The general view in the literature is that procedural fairness outweighs concerns
of substantive unfairness-the vote is determinative of whether or not the
transaction should proceed. Yet these arguments are expressed in the context
of a change of control transaction between two unrelated parties. In Magna,
by contrast, the change of control transaction involved a collapse of a dualclass share structure by way of a share buy-back (or issuer bid) between related
parties-the Stronach Trust, on behalf of Magna's controlling shareholder
(Stronach), and Magna, the firm that Stronach founded. Although it is important to examine the specific context of each particular capital structure at
issue, the general rationale underpinning dual-class share structures is to allow
firms to build their businesses by accessing capital without the founder having
46
to fear that he or she will lose the business by falling prey to a hostile takeover.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

"Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 JL & Econ 395 at 401-06.
Ibid at 402.
"The Promise of State Takeover Statutes" (1988) 86 Mich L Rev 1635 at 1682.
Ibidat 1684.
Ibidat 1685.
See Tara Gray, "Dual Class Share Structures and Best Practices in Corporate Governance"
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2005), online: Parliamentary Information and Research Service
<http://www2.part.gc.calContent/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0526-e.htm> at 5. Gray
states:
Historically, .Canadian companies issued shares with multiple voting rights to preserve family
control while gaining access to capital in public equity markets. To retain voting control over the
firm, the family kept the high-voting stock for themselves and sold the restricted-voting shares
to the public. Even today, these structures are common among family businesses that wish to go
public, and often represent a transitional phase between private and full public ownership.
See also Stephanie Ben-lshai & Poonam Purl, "Dual Class Shares in Canada: A Historical Analysis"
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Furthermore, the issuance of non-voting shares allows corporations to instill a
sense of ownership among employees without altering control."
The literature tells us little about why, in this particular circumstance, the vote
should be determinative of whether or not the transaction should proceed. Multiplevoting share structures place economic power in the hands of superior class
shareholders, even if they do not carry the bulk of the financial risk. In addition, such
structures give rise to an agency problem, whereby the controlling shareholder can
extort additional proceeds from the firm to the detriment of minority shareholders.
Thus, in Magna, as stated in the introduction, while the minority shareholders were
48
presented with a choice, it was a choice between the lesser of two evils.
Some may say that the minority shareholders exposed themselves to this possibility by purchasing shares in Magna with knowledge of its dual-class share structure
and controlling shareholder. This is a fair point, and absent the existence of a securities
regulator whose mandate is to protect investors under a broad-based public interest power, it would be persuasive. However, the role of the OSC is to ensure that
capital markets, and especially investors in those markets, are protected. Exercising
this power may mean, and has previously meant, that abusive transactions are not
permitted to proceed. The argument in the following part rests on the claim that
the OSC did not properly exercise its public interest jurisdiction in this case in allowing the transaction to proceed.

(2006) 29 Dal LJ 117. Past restrictions on foreign investment also served to encourage the
use of dual-class share structures.
47. For these reasons, multiple voting structures are permitted under corporate statutes in Canada,
although typically at least one class of shares must carry the right to vote. See Canada Business
CorporationsAct, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 24(3)-(4). See also Robert WV Dickerson, John L Howard
& Leon Getz, Proposalsfor a New Business CorporationLawfor Canada (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1971) at 9 and Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 46.
48. Examples of these private benefits included Mr. Stronach holding 0.6 per cent of Magna's
equity; establishing a separate corporation (Magna Entertainment) that invested in horse
racing, which related more to Mr. Stronach's personal tastes than to the manufacturing of
auto parts; and entering into lucrative consulting contracts. Professor lacobucci calls this
[t]he elephant in the room. Under the status quo, Stronach controlled Magna while holding only
0.6% of the stock. This creates a conflict of interest: Stronach can use his influence on the corporation
to benefit himself whether or not these benefits are shares generally by investors. For every dollar
that Magna spent on actions that benefited Stronach personally, Stronach was out of pocket 0.6 cents.
This creates very strong incentives to rake self-interested actions at the expense of minority shareholders.
Edward lacobucci, "Making Sense of Magna," in this volume 237 at 251 [lacobucci,
"Making Sense"].
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B. THE FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In Magna, the OSC focused on disclosure and voting as the means to ensure
that the minority shareholders would be able to make a fully informed decision. In doing so, the OSC stopped short of a full analysis of public interest
that takes into account the defining principle of the public interest power set
forth in Asbestos. That is, the OSC failed to consider whether the Magna transaction-and similar transactions modelled on it-should be prevented because
they would undermine the integrity of capital markets on a prospective basis.
Therefore, the OSC shied away from the very purpose of its public interest role.
To reiterate, after Canadian Tire, no violation of the law is required for
the public interest power to be exercised. Rather, as the OSC held in that case,
abusive transactions should not proceed because of the deleterious impact they
can have on capital market confidence. Individuals will, the OSC reasoned,9
have less confidence in capital markets if abusive transactions are permitted .
Canadian Tire thus set the stage for a broad application of jurisdiction relating
to the public interest by securities regulators. In Asbestos, the Court narrowed
the breadth of Canadian Tire, stating that "the public interest jurisdiction of
the OSC is not unlimited.". Writing for the Court, Justice lacobucci upheld
the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. He considered section 127 as
one element in an entire scheme of enforcement provisions in the Securities Act.
He noted that under sections 122 and 128, the courts are able to remedy or
punish past conduct. In contrast, he reasoned that under section 127, the goal
is to protect the public interest on a prospective basis.51
Understanding Canadian Tire and Asbestos allows us to better analyze the
OSC's decision in Magna. Given the similarities between the transactions in
Magna and Canadian Tire, it is perhaps surprising that the OSC did not cease
trade in the Magna transaction. Both were change of control transactions involving dual-class share structures, both involved a sizable premium to be paid to
the controlling shareholder, both were alleged to be abusive of the public interest, and in both cases, cease trade orders were sought by OSC staff. However,
while the OSC granted a cease trade order in Canadian Tire, it did not do so
in Magna.
The OSC distinguished the issues that arose in Magna from those in Canadian
Tire on the basis that the Class A shareholders in the latter case had a reasonable
49. Canadian Tire, supra note 19 at para 151.
50. Asbestos, supra note 4 at para 41.
51. Ibidatpara45.
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expectation, because of the coattail, that they would share in any control premium paid for their shares. By contrast, in Magna, the minority shareholders
had no coattail and thus knew that they were not going to be allowed to share
in the premium, nor allowed to vote on the transaction.52 Viewed in this light,
Magna seems quite different from Canadian Tire. The absence of a coattail in
Magna meant that "the Stronach Trust was legally entitled to sell its Class B
shares to any purchaser as whatever price it negotiated." 3 This was true as a
matter of pure contractual interpretation.
However, securities regulation places a layer of regulatory considerations over
and above the contract that shareholders have entered into with the corporation.
These considerations include the concept of public interest,which has traditionally
meant more than the reasonable expectations of shareholders. While there were
undoubtedly factual differences between Magna and Canadian Tire, it was the
OSC's holding in the latter case that broadened the public interest power, ensuring
that this power is flexible enough to respond to abusive transactions that are or
may be injurious to capital markets. As the OSC stated in Canadian Tire:
[T]he Legislature has vested in the OSC the power to intervene where it has been
demonstrated that such intervention is necessary to fulfill the OSC's mandate to
regulate the capital markets in the public interest ....
A regulatory agency charged
with oversight of the capital markets must have the capacity to move quickly to stop
transactions which it considers to be injurious to the capital markets.5

After Canadian ire, and certainly afterAsbestos, it is evident that there is a societal
aspect to the public interest power that was neither considered nor applied in Magna.
In applying section 127 of the SecuritiesAct, the OSC must have in mind the prospective integrity of capital markets.
Given the strong precedents in Canadian Tire and Asbestos, it is questionable why the OSC did not intervene to prevent the Magna transaction in the
public interest. The minority shareholders in Magna had a reasonable expectation
(voiced effectively by the opposing shareholders) that they would not be presented with a lose-lose proposition and that in the case of a buyout of the controlling
shareholder's interest, the board and special committee would ensure a fair price
was being offered to them. At the very least, following Canadian Tire, the question arises as to why the OSC did not order a coattail in Magna and thereby allow
the Class A shareholders the opportunity to convert their shares to Class B shares
and tender on the same terms as Stronach.
52. FulI Reasons, supra note I at para 188.
53. Ibidat para 189.
54. Canadian Tire, supra note 19 at para 127.
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DEFERENCE TO THE SUPERIOR COURT'S PROCESS

Ultimately, in the Magna case, the OSC deferred to the Superior Court's determination of whether the transaction was fair to the minority shareholders. "There is little
precedent for the OSC's deference to the court in this respect, especially given that the
concept of public interest historically has not included an analysis of, and reliance
on, courts' considerations of fairness.
The Superior Court's own analysis of fairness raises questions. It considered
fairness from the standpoint of the "fair and reasonable" calculation pertaining to the
law of arrangements. When a court is approving an arrangement, BCE requires,
first, that the applicant must have complied strictly with the statutory provisions
relating to plans of arrangement; second, that the plan of arrangement must be put
forward in good faith; and third, that the plan must be fair and reasonable.55 It is
this third principle-the "fair and reasonable" requirement-that primarily concerned the Supreme Court in BCE and the Superior Court
in Magna.
In Magna, Justice Wilton-Siegel articulated the two prongs of the "fair and reasonable" calculation: first, whether the arrangement has a valid business purpose;
and second, whether the objections of those who oppose the transaction are being
resolved in a fair and balanced manner.5 6 In terms of whether the transaction
had a valid business purpose, he affirmed that the Magna transaction did-namely,
the elimination of the dual-class share structure. He then held that the "fair and
balanced" aspect of the test was met despite the absence of traditional indicia
of fairness, including a fairness opinion and a recommendation from the board.
Finally, he held that the shareholder vote is a proxy for the transaction's fairness
57

and reasonableness.
In contrast to Justice Wilton-Siegel's decision, the Court in BCE laid out
numerous factors relevant to the decision of whether the arrangement fairly balanced
the ongoing interests of the corporation, 8 including: whether a majority of security
holders voted to approve the arrangement; whether an intelligent and honest busi-

55. BCE, supra note 3 at para 46.
56. Magna InternationalInc (Re), 2010 ONSC 4123 at para 102 [Application], citing BCE, ibid
at para 132.
57. Application, supra note 56 at paras 166-67. But see also remarks by Justice Wilton-Siegel
following the transaction, in Tim Kiladze, "Magna board 'spectacularly' vacated field:
judge," The Globe and Mail, 22 February 2011, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
globe-investor/investment-ideas/streetwise/magna-board-spectacuarly-vacated-field-judge/
article9l 16419/>.
58. BCE, supra note 3 at para 148. See also Anita I Anand, "Flexibility vs. Certainty: The Law
Relating to Arrangements after BCE" (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 174.
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ness person, as a member of the class concerned acting in his or her own interest,
might reasonably approve the plan;59 whether the compromise between various
securities was proportionate; whether security holders' positions before and after
the arrangement had changed and in what respects; whether security holders'
rights had been impacted; whether the reputations of directors and advisors who
endorsed the arrangement were questionable; whether a special committee
existed; whether a fairness opinion had been delivered from a reputable expert;
and whether shareholders had access to dissent and appraisal remedies."
In the end, rather than applying the multitude of factors laid out in BCE,
Justice Wilton-Siegel relied on three indicia of fairness: (1) the outcome of the
shareholder vote, (2) the market reaction to the announcement that provided
evidence to shareholders that they had a reasonable possibility of realizing a
potential gain from the transaction, and (3) the presence of a liquid trading
market into which the shareholders could sell their shares at prices equal to or
greater than the pre-announcement price. These indicia can be summed up as
hold that it is fair if it is better than the status quo. There was little balancing of
the factors set forth in BCE. The compromise between various securities seemed
disproportionate; the special committee existed, but did a poor job of identifying
transactional benefits,6 1 and there was no fairness opinion.
Regardless of the flaws in Justice Wilton-Siegel's analysis of the fair and
reasonable test (which are arguably besides the point for the purposes of this
analysis), the OSC should not have relied on the Superior Court's process to
determine fairness. The court's test of fairness need not (and did not) consider
the broader implications of capital markets-it only considered the fairness to
Magna and its shareholders. Neither the court nor the OSC opined on the substantive fairness of the transaction. The OSC held, from a procedural standpoint,
that the transaction was fair because the shareholders would vote on it and the
court would examine the transaction. The court held that the transaction was fair
because the shareholders approved it. Neither body, however, analyzed whether
59.
60.

Ibidatpara151.
Ibid at para 152. The Court stated that
in determining whether a plan of arrangement is fair and reasonable, the judge must be satisfied
that the plan serves a valid business purpose and that it adequately responds to the objections
and conflicts between different affected parties. Whether these requirements are met is determined
by taking into account a variety of relevant factors, including the necessity of the arrangement
to the corporation's continued existence, the approval, if any, of a majority of shareholders and other
security holders entitled to vote, and the proportionality of the impact on affected groups.

61.

Ibidat para 154.
lacobucci, "Making Sense," supra note 48.
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the transaction was fair to the minority shareholders in substance, nor did they
evaluate whether it was abusive to prospective capital markets.

III. POLICY ANALYSIS
The gist of the discussion thus far has focused on the fact that the OSC did not
exercise its public interest jurisdiction according to pre-defined principles that
hold that the public interest power is preventative, prospective, and concerned
with the well-being of capital markets as a whole. Rather, it deferred to the Superior
Court and to the processes inherent in statutes and case law relating to arrangements
to determine the issue. In short, the OSC relied on fairness of process in court-driven
corporate law procedures rather than the substantive elements of the public interest embedded in securities regulation. Still, we have not yet answered whether the
Magna transaction violated the public interest, and, if so, what should occur from
a regulatory standpoint as a result.
A. WHY MAGNA SHOULD HAVE BEEN CEASE TRADED
Why did this transaction violate the public interest and therefore warrant regulatory
intervention? In securities law, decisions about whether a transaction is abusive
are separate from expost improvements in firm value. Thus, while the value of Magna's
common shares increased significantly following the arrangement, this is not an
indication that the public interest was not violated.
The concept of abuse relates to two principal factors: the treatment of shareholders in the transaction at issue and the transactions prospective impact on capital
markets. T1he first factor prompts several questions: Did the board make a recommendation to the shareholders? Were a fairness opinion and/or valuation
provided? Is there a coattail? Do shareholders have the right to vote, and, if so, do
they have adequate information? The second factor refers to the prospective impact
of allowing the transaction to proceed in terms of the individual shareholders in
the corporation, the investing public at large, and capital markets generally.
On both fronts, it appears that the Magna transaction was abusive and that
the OSC should have intervened. It must be recognized that the 1,800 per cent
premium was exorbitant in comparison to both market value and the typical price
range that would be paid to eliminate a controlling shareholder.62 In the face of
62. See Ben Amaoko-Adu, Brian Smith & Vishaal Baulkaran, "Unification of Dual-class Shares
in Canada with Clinical Case on Magna International" (Paper delivered at the Capital Markets
Institute Conference on Dual-class Shares, Rotman School of Management, University of
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an astoundingly high premium, the processes that the Magna board and special
committee followed warranted close scrutiny and ultimately were inadequate.63
The special committee did not obtain a fairness opinion, and the board did not
make a recommendation to shareholders. Furthermore, no valuation was provided.
Over and above the absence of these traditional safeguards, as Professor lacobucci
argues, the special committee concluded that the transaction had benefits for Magna
without assuring itself that it was positive for Class A shareholders." However, the
question must be asked: If the board refuses to make a recommendation, and no
valuation or fairness opinion is provided, how is it that the minority shareholders
are to arrive at an informed opinion that underpins their position and ultimately
their vote? Therefore, process becomes strikingly important at the end of the day.
There may be a natural tendency to view the board's decision-making process
solely as one relating to directors' fiduciary duties that, as Justice Wilton-Siegel
held, are to be discharged by the board in the best interests of the corporation rather
than in the best interests of any one particular stakeholder group (e.g., Class A
shareholders). This conclusion follows from Peoples DepartmentStores Inc (Trustee op)
v Wise 5 and BCE.66 However, from a securities regulation standpoint, whether the
board breached its fiduciary duties is not the central question and arguably is irrelevant in a determination of whether the public interest has been violated. The OSC
is required to consider the interests of Class A shareholders as part of its investor
protection and public interest mandate. Even if the duties of the board are relevant,
they are not determinative in a public interest analysis.
Quite apart from the fate of Class A shareholders in this particular circumstance,
the OSC's decision establishes a poor legal precedent. Canadian Tire allowed for
Toronto 15 February 2011, [unpublished], online: <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/userfiles/
cmi/file/Magna%20Unif2_Feb%207/o20(Revised).pdf>. The paper compares
Stronach's percentage return to the return paid to what other companies paid their controlling
shareholders who held superior voting shareholders of the 31 previous cases of unification on
the TSX, only one had a special payout to the controlling shareholder similar to that of Magna
...
[o]n a comparative basis with other unification deals, the Stronach case is exceptionally large.
Ibid at 14.
63. See Kiladze, supra note 57. Kiladze's opinion on Justice Wilton-Siegel's remarks following the
conclusion of the transaction that the board "spectacularly vacated the field" is notable.
64. lacobucci, "Making Sense," supra note 48.
65. [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Peoples].
66. According to the Peoples and BCE decisions, the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests
of the corporation is not owed to any particular class of stakeholders of the corporation, and
is not owed uniquely to its shareholders. See Edward lacobucci, "Indeterminacy and the
Canadian Supreme Court's Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties" (2009) 48 Can
Bus LJ 232.
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securities regulators to prevent abusive transactions in which shareholders are
inadequately protected either because of the procedures adopted by the corporation
or because of the substantive terms of the deal itself. This broad power is at the very
heart of the OSC's public interest jurisdiction. However, after Magna,as long as a court
vets the transaction and shareholders have a vote under corporate law processes,
it appears that firms can dismantle their dual-class share structures by paying
unprecedented prices to the controlling shareholder with minimal safeguards in
place at the board level ex ante and with minimal OSC intervention expost. This
is the despotic power of the controlling shareholder.
After Magna, there will likely be some impact on dual-class firms in terms of
their costs of capital. Restricted share issuances will presumably be more cosdy for any
dual-class corporation, given that equity owners are going to price in a premium
for conversion. Magna renders it important for firms to dismantle their dual-class
structures in order to avoid a prospective increase in the cost of capital but at the
same time makes it more expensive to do so.
B. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOLLOWING MAGNA
Current regulation relating to dual-class structures found in the OSC Rule 56501 requires disclosure about restricted shares in offering documents but does
not contain requirements for coattails.67 In addition, the Toronto Stock Exchange
Company Manualmandates coattail provisions as a condition to listing any new
restricted shares. 68 However, firms that already have dual-class structures in place
are not required to insert a coattail in the share conditions of the subordinated
class. Prior to the transaction, Magna was one such firm.
The OSC has examined the issue of mandating coattails in the past. In 1983,
the OSC indicated that it would intervene where the shareholders had been
abused but it expressed faith in firms themselves to ensure that the appropriate
protections were implemented (thereby undermining the need for regulation).69

67.
68.

69.

Restricted Shares, OSC, Rule 56-501 (2008).
Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual, s 624, online: TMX Group <http://tmx.complinet.
com/en/tsx_manual.html>. Prior to OSC Rule 56-50 1, the OSC implemented Policy 1.3, which
was rescinded in 1999. This policy had been preceded by intensive debate in the press and
hearings held by the OSC itself. This history is outlined in Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note
46. At the time of implementation, the TSX indicated that it would take action against
firms that structured a bid to avoid the spirit of the policy. See TSX Company Manual, s
624, online: Thomson Reuters Accelus <http://tmx.complinet.com/en/display/display.
html?rbid=2072&element id=299>.
Ben-lshai & Puri, supra note 46 at 148.
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The OSC was averse to abolishing dual-class share structures but argued that
the "appropriate approach" to regulating dual-class shares would entail "giv[ing]
investors a stronger voice in the corporate action required to create these shares,
and to prescribe certain minimum standards for the terms of these shares to protect holders in the event of a takeover bid for the issuer."7 'The OSC was of the
view that issuing restricted shares without protective or coattail provisions was
contrary to legislative policy. 1 Yet, the OSC stopped short of mandating coattails, perhaps because the TSX policy that emerged in the meantime was aimed at
providing a more equitable opportunity for restricted shareholders to participate
in an offering through a right of conversion.72
Magna demonstrates, at the very least, the potential for abuse in dual-class
firms where no coattails attach to the subordinate shares. It calls for a reexamination of the OSC's approach to dual-class structures, coattail provisions,
and indeed ex ante regulation that governs issuers' behaviour on the collapse
of these structures. Implementing mandatory coattail provisions (for new and
existing dual-class firms) would be consistent with the OSC's equal treatment
principle embodied in Part XX of the Securities Act, which, at present, requires
identical consideration to be paid to shareholders within a class but not across
share classes.73
It has been argued that mandatory coattails may by inefficient because controlling shareholders are not paid a sufficient premium to relinquish control.7"
If this is true, then perhaps dual-class share structures should be banned as
potentially abusive if not outright abusive. T-his legal change could be efficient
despite the increased benefits that would then exist for firms seeking to dismantle
their dual-class structures because of the Magna transaction. Indeed, Ben Amaoko-Adu, Brian Smith, and Vishaal Baulkaran recently found that elimination
75
of dual-class share structures increases stock prices and improves stock liquidity.
At the very least, one can argue that the regulation of transactions in which
dual-class share structures are collapsed is, or should be, reconsidered after the
OSC's decision in Magna.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Ibid at 148, citing "Position Paper Draft and Interim Policy on Restricted Shares and Request
for Comments," OSC Position Paper, (1984) 7 OSC Bull.
Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 46 at 149.
TSX Company Manual,supra note 68, s624.
See SecuritiesAct, supra note 17, s 97(1). See also Edward lacobucci, "Why does Ontario
Require Equal Treatment in Sales of Corporate Control?" (2008) 58 UTLJ 123.
See lacobucci, ibid.
Supra note 6 2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
At the announcement of the plan of arrangement on 6 May 2010, the market
price of Magna's common shares (which were the Class A shares prior to the
arrangement) soared from CAD $32.14 to CAD $36.63 (a 14 per cent increase)
and has since climbed to CAD $45.50, dipping slightly from even higher values.7 6
The question arises as to why common shares have increased in value if the transaction was abusive. Magna's management might say that the market has priced in
the collapse of the dual-class structure. But this is not necessarily the case. The reason
may well be related to the market's view of the firm's growth prospects. Without
question, it is difficult to separate these two occurrences.
A more pertinent question perhaps is whether Magna's Class A shareholders
would have paid the price they did to purchase their shares if they knew that
there would be a large conversion premium that would be exercised. Viewing the
transaction in hindsight, it is not clear that they would have done so. Class A
shareholders likely had a reasonable expectation that they would not be asked to
choose between an exorbitant premium and the retention of a controlling shareholder
that extracted significant private benefits of control. They would have reasonably
expected the securities regulator to protect their interests (as well as those of other
capital market participants) and to preserve capital market integrity. This is the role
of the securities regulator.

76.

As of 1 June 2011. Ticker: TSE: MG. Data from TSE and Google Finance, online: Google
<http://www.google.ca/finance?q=TSE%3AMG>. See also Macintosh, supra note 6 (who
analyzes Magna's stock price movements over the course of the transaction and beyond).

